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Abstract
SecSpaces is a data-driven coordination model that supports a tuple-based coordination space
extended with mechanisms for controlling and authenticating the access to entries. This is achieved
exploiting the notion of (symmetric and asymmetric) abstract partitions inside the space. In this
paper we consider one of the limitations of SecSpaces: it is not well suited for supporting the
atomic access to more than one partition at once. In order to tackle this limitation we extend the
SecSpaces model introducing an operator to combine partitions; output operations can use the
new operator to make an entry visible in more than one partition, and data-retrieval operations
can use it to access atomically more than one partition. We formally deﬁne, in terms of a process
calculus, this notion and we demonstrate the ﬂexibility of this new mechanism via examples.
1 Introduction
Coordination languages and models aim at providing mechanisms and lan-
guages for developing distributed applications in which the description of the
internal behaviour of the active components and the description of their inter-
dependencies are distinct and separated. In order to support this separation,
general interaction models have been developed; one of the main approaches
consists of separating the computation from the interaction information, and
locating the former inside the active components and the latter inside a so-
called coordination infrastructure. This approach is called data-driven coordi-
nation when the interaction information is stored inside a shared data space.
Linda [3] and its dialects [8,10,7,6] are the most prominent representatives of
this family of coordination languages.
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The Linda coordination model is based on a common repository where the
interacting components introduce and retrieve the coordination information:
the data inside the repository are tuples (ordered sequences of data) and they
are retrieved using a pattern matching mechanism. Processes willing to collect
tuples indicate with a template the structure of the tuples they are interested
in: the template indicates the number of ﬁelds and the exact content for some
of these ﬁelds. A tuple inside the repository satisﬁes the template if it has the
requested number of ﬁelds and it contains, at least in the indicated ﬁelds, the
requested data.
The native coordination model does not include any support for control-
ling the access to the data. For example, any process able to access the
repository is also able to introduce, retrieve and consume any of the tuples
inside the repository itself. Recent distributed applications such as Web Ser-
vices, applications for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), Peer to Peer
Applications (P2P) are inherently open to processes, agents, components that
are not known at design time. When the Linda coordination model is ex-
ploited to program the coordination inside this class of applications (see e.g.
WSSecSpaces [5] for Web Services, Lime [6] in the context of MANETs and
PeerSpaces [11] for P2P applications) it is convenient to extend the native
coordination model with mechanisms for controlling the access, for authenti-
cating the producer/consumer of data, for ensuring the secrecy of information,
and so on.
Some extensions have been already presented in the literature. The Klaim
model [7] (Kernel Language for Agent Interaction and Mobility) exploits clas-
sic access control policies to manage the access of processes to tuple spaces.
Access permissions describe the operations that each process may perform on
each of the available tuple spaces. In open systems, especially in those with
a high level of dynamicity, the managing of these information may be a crit-
ical task, mainly because the system should support a rapid and sometimes
uncontrolled evolution of the agent community. More precisely, new agents
may frequently enter the system, as well as old agents may rapidly exit, in
an uncontrolled manner. Moreover, in some applications it could be useful to
have a ﬁner grained control, e.g., at the level of tuples and not at the level of
spaces. For example, we may want to ensure that an agent cannot read tuples
with a private content, but it can read all of the other tuples.
SecOS [9] follows a quite diﬀerent approach. The access rights are not
associated to the agents, but all control information are stored inside the data.
More precisely, SecOS supports two forms of locks which are called symmetric
and asymmetric. The former exploits the same key to protect and access the
information, while the latter uses a pair of keys, one to protect and another
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one to access. This two locking techniques can be applied to protect either one
single ﬁeld inside a tuple or the whole tuple. In the ﬁrst case the used locks
are called Field-locks, while in the second one, they are called Object-locks.
A more recent proposal, called SecSpaces [2], continues the approach
initiated by SecOS by reﬁning its access control policies. More precisely,
SecSpaces reﬁnes the idea of object locks while ﬁeld locks are not modeled.
However, this is not a limitative approach because ﬁeld locks can be easily
encoded in our model. For example, in SecOS it is not possible to discrimi-
nate between the non-destructive readers and the destructive consumers of a
tuple, and there is neither the possibility to avoid a reader of a tuple to re-
produce exactly that tuple. In SecSpaces, on the other hand, it is possible to
associate to the tuples two diﬀerent access control information, one to be used
for non-destructive read and the other one for destructive input operations.
Moreover, when a tuple is accessed in SecSpaces, the reading process receives
only the coordination information inside the tuple and not the access control
information; thus, it is unable to reproduce exactly that tuple.
SecSpaces essentially permits to associate to the tuples two pairs of infor-
mation, that now we call entries. Each pair (p, k) contains a symmetric access
information p (called symmetric partition) and an asymmetric access informa-
tion k (called asymmetric partition). For both kind of access information a
default value is deﬁned, thus processes can also explicitly set only one or none
of them. In order for a reader to access an information, it must demonstrate
the knowledge of p as well as of k, the access information corresponding the
asymmetric partition k. Two of these pairs (p, k) are used; the ﬁrst one is
considered in the case the reader is willing to perform a non-destructive read
operation, and the second is considered for destructive input operations.
In this paper we investigate, in the context of SecSpaces, the problem of
modifying during the lifetime of the application the access control policies.
This is particularly useful in applications where the participants may become
able to access new resources because, e.g., they pay for it, or in applications
where processes may access the shared resources according to an associated
level of trust, and this level may increase or decrease according to their run-
time behaviour.
Tha native SecSpaces model is not particularly suited to support appli-
cations with this dynamic aspects. For example, if two separated groups of
users decide at run time to join in a unique group, it is necessary to explic-
itly modify the access control information stored inside the entries currently
used from both those groups of users. An alternative solution is to permit
the users to exploit more expressive access rights indicating the intention to
atomically access the data of both groups. Suppose, on the other hand, that
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it is necessary to exclude at run time a user from a group because its level of
trust is decreased. In this context, to exclude a user means that it should have
no more access to the new entries exchanged among the users of the group.
Also in this case, the native SecSpaces model requires to explicitly modify
the access control information stored inside the entries of the group.
The solution that we present consists of extending SecSpaces with the
possibility to: i) create, at run time, fresh symmetric partitions, ii) combine
partitions. We can combine partitions by using the merge operator, denoted
by “:”, whose meanings depends on the operation the process is performing:
• when a process perform a data-retrieval operation by using the merge of
partitions p and p′, that is p : p′, it implicitly access the partitions p and p′;
• when a process inserts an entry into the space by combining partitions p
and p′, that is p : p′, that entry will be visible by processes that have access
to one among the p and p′ partitions.
In the paper we demonstrate that this simple extension of the SecSpaces
coordination model is expressive enough to add a signiﬁcant level of dynamic-
ity. For example, in order to exclude users from a group that exchange entries
using the partition p, it is suﬃcient to produce a new partition p′, to distribute
the knowledge of p′ only to the users that remain inside the group, and to start
using: i) the new partition p′ to exchange new entries, and ii) the combination
p : p′ to access all the entries produced by the group (all the new and all those
ones produced before the group restriction).
It is worth noting that these extensions involve only the symmetric parti-
tions and not the asymmetric ones. This follows from the fact that the two
kinds of partitions are intended to represent diﬀerent kinds of information.
The symmetric partitions are used to limit the access to entries, while the
asymmetric partitions are used to authenticate the producer/consumer of an
entry. To this aim, the asymmetric partitions are intended to be produced and
distributed using oﬀ-line mechanisms (such as standard public key infrastruc-
tures PKI) and not the mechanisms provided by the SecSpaces coordination
model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we recall
the SecSpaces coordination model which is deﬁned in terms of a process cal-
culus, in Section 3 we extend the process calculus introducing the possibility
to create new partitions as well as combining partitions, in Section 4 and 5
we describe some applications that demonstrate the ﬂexibility of the new ex-
tensions in order to model several access control policies, and in Section 6 we
report some conclusive remarks.
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2 The SecSpaces coordination model
SecSpaces [2] is a coordination model that supports secure data-driven coor-
dination in open environments. SecSpaces extends Linda [3] by introducing
some forms of control of the accesses to the entries stored in the coordination
space, that permit for example to authenticate/identify the producer of an
entry or its reader/consumer.
The coordination primitives of SecSpaces are the classical ones of Linda:
out(e), in(t) and rd(t). The output operator out(e) inserts an entry e in the
space. Primitive in(t) is the blocking input operator: when an occurrence of
an entry e matching with the template t is found in the space, it is removed
and its content is returned. The read primitive rd(t) is similar to in(t), but
in this case the entry e is not removed from the space.
In order to express access permissions on entries SecSpaces extends the
Linda tuples by decorating them with special control ﬁelds, namely partition
and asymmetric partition ﬁelds. The former ones logically partition the space,
while the latter ones provide a mean to discriminate between the write and
the read/remove access permissions on each entry.
Let Mess, ranged over by m, n, . . ., be an inﬁnite set of messages, Partition,
ranged over by c, ct, . . ., be the set of partitions and APartition, ranged over
by k, k′, kt, . . ., be the set of asymmetric partitions. We also assume that
Partition (resp. APartition) contains a special default value, say # (resp.
?), used to allow any agent to access the space. Let “ · : APartition →
APartition” be a function, deﬁning the co-key relationship, such that ? = ?
and if k = k′ then k′ = k.
Access permissions on entries are expressed by the control ﬁelds; in order
to discriminate between the rd and the in access permission, entries have two
occurrences of control ﬁelds, one associated to in operations and the other
one to the rd operations. Diﬀerently from entries, templates have only one
occurrence of control ﬁelds that is not associated to a speciﬁc operation: they
are dynamically associated to the operation the agent is willing to perform
(i.e., rd or in).
The set Entry of entries, ranged over by e, e′, . . ., is deﬁned as follows:
e = 〈d〉
[c]rd[c
′]in
[k]rd[k′]in
where c, c′ ∈ Partition, k, k′ ∈ APartition and the tuple of data d is a term
of the following grammar:
d ::= d | d; d,
d ::= m | c | k.
A data field d can be a message, a partition or an asymmetric partition.
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We deﬁne ·˜ as the function that, given an entry e, returns its tuple of
data, i.e., if e = 〈d〉
[c]rd[c
′]in
[r]rd[r′]in
, e˜ = d.
The set Template of templates, ranged over by t, t′, . . ., is deﬁned as
follows:
t = 〈dt〉
[ct]
[kt]
where ct ∈ Partition, kt ∈ APartition and dt is a term of the grammar
dt ::= dt | dt; dt,
dt ::= d | null.
With respect to entries, data ﬁelds used by templates can also be set to an
additional value (null) that denotes the wildcard: the wildcard is used to
match with all ﬁeld values.
Definition 2.1 Matching rule and return value – Let e = 〈d1; d2; . . . ;
dn〉
[c]rd[c
′]in
[k]rd[k′]in
be an entry, t = 〈dt1; dt2; . . . ; dtm〉
[ct]
[kt]
be a template and op ∈
{rd, in} be an operation. Let ce and ke be the control ﬁelds of e associated to
op, we say that e matchesop t if the following conditions hold:
(i) m = n
(ii) dti = di or dti = null, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(iii) ce = ct
(iv) ke = kt.
If a rd or in operation with template t is performed on a matching entry e,
only the data ﬁelds (and no control ﬁeld) are returned, i.e., the return value
is e˜.
Conditions (i) and (ii) rephrase the classical Linda matching rule, that is
test if e and t have the same arity and if each data ﬁeld of e is equal to the cor-
responding ﬁeld of t or if this latter one is set to wildcard. Condition (iii) tests
that the partition ﬁeld of the entry –associated to the operation op– is equal
to that of the template. Condition (iv) checks that the asymmetric partition
ﬁeld of the template corresponds to the co-key of the asymmetric partition
ﬁeld of the entry associated to the operation op. Finally, a comment about
return value of the data-retrieval operations: it does not include the control
ﬁelds of the matching entries but only the data stored inside the tuple of data
ﬁelds. In this way, new access permissions can be acquired only by performing
read/input operations of entries containing partition or asymmetric partition
values inside the tuple of data.
Partition ﬁelds can be viewed as a special kind of data ﬁelds that do not
accept wildcard in the matching evaluation. Partition ﬁelds logically partition-
ate the space (each partition contains the entries having a speciﬁc partition
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value as partition ﬁeld that identiﬁes the partition) and the access to a par-
tition is restricted to only those processes that know the partition identiﬁer.
Indeed, in order to perform an operation on a partition, processes must know
the partition ﬁeld identifying that speciﬁc partition. However, in order to
allow any process to interact with each other via SecSpaces primitives, a spe-
cial default value # of the partition ﬁeld, that every one can use, has been
deﬁned. Similarly, a default value known by any process has also been deﬁned
for asymmetric partition ﬁelds (denoted by “?”).
The asymmetric partition ﬁelds, diﬀerently from partitions, make it possi-
ble to discriminate between the write and the read/remove permission of an
entry, simply by exploiting the diﬀerent needed knowledge to produce or to
read/remove an entry. For instance, in order to read an entry having asymmet-
ric partition ﬁeld set to k the process must use k as asymmetric partition ﬁeld
of the template, that can be an unknown value for the producer of that entry
(because in only k is needed). Therefore, following the same idea of partitions,
properly distributing these values we can assign processes the permission to
perform a subset of possible operations on that entry.
3 SecSpaces with combined partitions
In this section we propose an extension of SecSpaces supporting dynamic
composition of partitions. More precisely, we introduce a new merge operator
on partitions (denoted by “:”) that can be used to express in which partitions
an entry should be accessible (when writing) or in which partitions to perform
the search of a matching entry (when reading or consuming). The language
we are going to presents extends [1] by introducing the merge operator on
partitions and an operator for the generation of new names for partitions. In
Section 3.1 we present the extended language and the new deﬁnition of the
matching rule, while Section 3.2 introduces the corresponding semantics.
3.1 The language
In this section the extended language is presented. More precisely, we ﬁrst
describe how partitions are extended with the new merge operator and then
we formalize system conﬁgurations, that are composed of: processes exploiting
SecSpaces coordination primitives and the state of the shared tuple space.
Let CPartition, ranged over by p, p′, . . ., be the set of possible combina-
tions of partitions deﬁned by the following grammar:
p ::= c | p : p.
The combination of partitions can be a partition value or the merge of par-
titions: “c : c′” represents the merge of the partitions identiﬁed by c and c′.
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We also deﬁne ps : CPartition −→ P(Partition) as the function that, given
a combination of partitions, returns the set of partitions it contains, whose
deﬁnition is the following: 1
ps(c) = {c}, ps(p1 : p2) = ps(p1) ∪ ps(p2).
Entry and template structure change in the symmetric partition ﬁelds that
now contains, instead of a partition c ∈ Partition, a combination of partitions
p ∈ CPartition. An entry e = 〈d〉
[p]rd[p
′]in
[k]rd[k′]in
means that it is available (i.e. it
appears) in the partitions contained in ps(p) and in ps(p′) for the rd and the
in primitives, respectively. On the other hand, a template t = 〈d〉
[pt]
[kt]
means
that the matching entry must be available in at least one partition in ps(pt).
The deﬁnition of the matching rule between entries and templates follows.
Definition 3.1 Matching rule with combined partitions – Let e =
〈d1; d2; . . . ; dn〉
[p]rd[p
′]in
[k]rd[k′]in
be an entry, t = 〈dt1; dt2; . . . ; dtm〉
[pt]
[kt]
be a template
and op ∈ {rd, in} be an operation. Let pe be the combined partition of e
associated to op, we say that e matchesop t if conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) of
Deﬁnition 2.1 and the following condition hold:
(iii)’ ps(pe) ∩ ps(pt) = φ.
Condition (iii)’ replaces (iii) of Deﬁnition 2.1 substantially checks that
there is at least one partition in which e is available that is contained in the
set of partitions indicated by the template.
When a matching entry is accessed from a removal operation, it is removed
by any partition in which it appears. The idea is that a process can exploit
the merge mechanism to produce an entry that must appear in more than one
partition by performing just one out operation; if a process needs to produce
more than one occurrence of the entry, it must perform an out operation for
each occurrence it needs.
It is worth noting that the same mechanisms can be implemented by in-
troducing, in the SecSpaces model, the non-blocking rdp and inp primitives
corresponding to the rd and in, and a transaction mechanism. Non-blocking
data-retrieval primitives have the same behaviour of the corresponding block-
ing ones in the case a matching entry is available, while in the opposite case
they immediately return with a failure value indicating the absence of a match-
ing entry. When processes need to perform a data-retrieval primitive accessing
more than one partition, say c and c′ (the extension to a generic number is
straightforward), they can exploit non-blocking primitives by alternatively
1 We assume that associative property for the merge operator holds, that is (c : c′) : c′′ =
c : (c′ : c′′).
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performing the access to partition c and to c′ until a matching entry is found.
On the other hand, in order to produce an entry that should appear in more
than one partition, an occurrence of the entry can be introduced in each par-
tition in which it should be available. Transactions are necessary because, in
order to consume that entry, the in operations should perform atomically the
removal of the matching entry from each partition in which it appears.
The entries stored in the TS are represented as members of parallel compo-
sition as processes. Let V ar, ranged over by x, y, . . ., be the set of data vari-
ables. In the following, we use x, y, . . ., to denote ﬁnite sequences x1; x2; . . . ; xn
of data variables.
System conﬁgurations, ranged over by A, B, . . ., and processes, ranged
over by P , Q, . . ., are deﬁned as follows:
A, B, . . . ::= systems
e entries
P processes
A | A parallel composition
(ν c)A restriction
P , Q, . . . ::= processes
0 null process
out e.P output
rd t(x).P read
in t(x).P input
P | P parallel composition
!P replication
(ν c)P restriction
A system can be an entry, a process or the parallel composition of entries
and processes. (ν c)A means that the partition name c is bound in the system
A. A process can be a terminated program 0, a preﬁx form µ.P , the parallel
composition of two programs, the replication of a program or it can contain a
partition name whose scope is restricted to the process. The preﬁx µ can be
one of the following classical Linda operations: i) out e, that writes the entry
e in the TS; ii) rd t(x), that given a template t reads a matching entry e in
the TS and stores the return value in x; iii) in t(x), that given a template t
consumes a matching entry e in the TS and stores the return value in x. A
process P | Q is the parallel composition of two processes P and Q behaves as
two processes running in parallel. Recursive process are expressed by using the
replication operator !P , whose meaning is the parallel composition of inﬁnite
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copies of P . Finally, processes can have bound names (partitions): (ν c)P
means that the partition name c is bound in the process P , hence it is known
only by P .
In the following, we use P [d/x] to denote the process that behaves as P
in which all occurrences of x are replaced with d. We also use P [d/x] to
denote the process obtained by replacing in P all occurrences of variables in
x with the corresponding value in d, that is P [d1; d2; . . . ; dn/x1; x2; . . . ; xn] =
P [d1/x1][d2/x2] . . . [dn/xn].
We say that a system is well formed if each rd/in 〈dt〉
[c]rd[c
′]in
[k]rd[k′]in
(x) operation
is such that the variables x and the tuple of data dt have the same arity.
Let fn(A) and fv(A) be the functions that given a system A return the set
of names that syntactically occur in A and the set of free variables in A,
respectively. We say that a system is closed if it has no free variable. In the
following, we consider only systems that are closed and well formed; we denote
with System the set of such systems.
3.2 Semantics
In this section we present the semantics of systems by deﬁning a structural
congruence over systems and by mapping them on a reduction relation that
describes how the system is reduced after one step of computation.
Table 1 describes a relation (structural congruence) indicating syntactic
diﬀerences between systems that do not inﬂuence the behaviour of processes.
More precisely, identity (i), reﬂexive (ii) and transitive (iii) relations hold, the
order of the systems parallel composition is not relevant (iv), associative rela-
tion holds (v), portions of system can be replaced with other ones structurally
equivalent (vi), null processes have no inﬂuence on the behaviour of the system
(vii), replication operator !P corresponds to an inﬁnite parallel composition of
P (viii), (ix), (x) and (xi) represent the scope laws and, ﬁnally, (xii) describes
the alpha conversion (i.e. choice of bound names is irrelevant). The structural
congruence over systems is deﬁned as the smallest congruence satisfying rules
(i), . . ., (xii).
Table 2 contains the system reduction rules. Rules (1), (2) and (3) describe
the three preﬁx operators in, rd, and out, respectively. More precisely: (1)
shows that the process in t(x).P can perform the input if there exists an entry
e currently available in the TS that matches the template t and, in this case,
e is removed from the TS and the process behaves as P [e˜/x]; (2) shows that
the process rd t(x).P can perform the read operation if there exists an entry
e currently available in the TS that matches the template t and, in this case,
the process behaves as P [e˜/x], and (3) shows that out e.P produces in one
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(i) A ≡ A (ii)
B≡A
A≡B
(iii)
A≡B B≡C
A≡C
(iv) A | B ≡ B | A
(v) (A | B) | C ≡ A | (B | C) (vi)
A≡A′
A|B≡A′|B
(vii) A | 0 ≡ A (viii) !P ≡ P |!P
(ix) (ν c) (ν c′)A ≡ (ν c′) (ν c)A (x) (ν c) 0 ≡ 0
(xi) (ν c) (A | B) ≡ (ν c)A | B, if c ∈ fn(B)
(xii) if A can be turn to B by alpha-conversion then A ≡ B
Table 1
Structural equivalence over systems
step a new occurrence of the entry e into the TS and then the process behaves
as P . Rules (4), (5) and (6) describe the behaviour of processes running in
parallel, that we can replace at any time a system with another one structurally
congruent, and how the interaction is restricted to the processes within the
scope operator, respectively. It is worth noting that rules (xi) and (xii) of
Table 1 and rules (1) and (2) allow us to implement the scope extrusion of
partition names as originally proposed in the π-calculus [?].
4 Group communication examples
The aim of this section is to describe scenarios where the extension of SecSpaces
we propose can be exploited to manage important task. In previous pa-
pers [1,2] we have already proved that some security properties in the in-
teraction among processes can be guaranteeted. In particular, we have shown
that it is possible to guarantee data secrecy, producer and receiver authenti-
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(1)
e matchesin t
e | in t(x).P −→ P [e˜/x]
(2)
e matchesrd t
e | rd t(x).P −→ e | P [e˜/x]
(3) out e.P −→ e | P (4)
A −→ A′
A | B −→ A′ | B
(5)
A ≡ B B −→ B′
A −→ B′
(6)
A −→ A′
(ν c)A −→ (ν c)A′
Table 2
Transition system
cation of an entry and data availability. Here we now recall recall the idea,
that we have already introduced in those papers, to implement a secure group
communication, where only entities of the group can access the entries used
in the group communication. In that work, we have considered a simple so-
lution in which the entities in the group share a secret partition, say c (that
can be considered as a session partition) that is used to restrict the access
to the exchanged entries: any communication is done by using entries and
templates having c as partition ﬁeld. In this way, no other process can read,
remove or produce an entry used to realize the group communication be-
cause c is not a public value, thus guaranteeing the privacy of the exchanged
data. An example of secure group communication follows (for the sake of
simplicity asymmetric partition ﬁelds, assumed that they are set to default
value, are omitted): (ν c) rd 〈null〉[c](x).out(〈x〉[c]rd[c]in) | out(〈d〉[c]rd[c]in). A
proposal of how to distribute the partition value c in a secure way (assuming
that asymmetric partition ﬁelds are properly distributed as explained in the
Introduction), to each process of the group, is described in Section 4.1.
While it is easy to manage the insertion of new entities in the group,
because it can be done simply by transmitting (in a secure way) the secret
partition of the group to the entity that is willing to enter (technically this is
obtained by scope extrusion, see Section 3.2), it is more complicated to manage
the removal of certain entities from the group communication, that is an usual
function of group key management systems, because a new partition should
be created and distributed to the processes in the group except the one to be
removed. A more general problem is to restrict the access to certain entries
to a subgroup of entities in the group. Section 4.1 explains how to manage
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the group restriction by exploiting the merge operator. Finally, Section 4.2
describes how to combine partitions in order to manage, at run-time, the
coordination among two (or more) independent groups of processes. More
precisely, we intend to provide a support for those applications that need to
publish some data and make them available to more than one group of users,
or to control the ﬂow of exchanged data among diﬀerent groups.
4.1 Group restriction
Let G = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a group of processes that exploit a shared (and private
to the group) partition c to communicate with each other in the group, and
Gp = {Pi, Pi+1 . . . , Ps} ⊆ G be a subset of the processes in G.
The problem we consider in this section is to:
i) provide a secure group communication for groups G and Gp, and
ii) allow processes in Gp (that should be considered privileged processes of
G) to perform data-retrieval operations that can atomically access entries
available either at the whole group or to privileged processes.
The solution we propose is to deﬁne, besides c, a new partition c′ that
is a shared and private value of privileged processes that exploit it in order
to restrict the communication at the level of group Gp. More formally, the
system conﬁguration we want to deﬁne is the following:
(ν c) (P1 | . . . | Pi−1 | (ν c
′) (Pi | . . . | Ps) | . . . | Pn).
Statements i) and ii) hold because: 1) each process in G can communicate with
each other in the group by using c as partition ﬁeld of the entries/templates
and, in addition, privileged processes can also restrict the communication to
the group Gp by inserting entries with a partition set to c
′, e.g., out(〈d〉[c
′]rd[c
′]in;
2) privileged processes in one step can access the two partitions, simply by
exploiting the merge operator, indicating c : c′ in the partition ﬁeld of the
template, for instance rd 〈null〉[c:c
′](x). A particular instance of this problem
is the removal of some users from the group: in this case to combine the
partition c with the new partition c′ allow us to atomically access the new
entries as well as to those ones produced before the removal of such users.
The following example describes a possible way to implement the secure
distribution of c′ to the processes in Gp.
Example 4.1 Given a process Pi that generates the new partition c
′, we con-
sider a set of s− i asymmetric partitions kij with j such that j : i+1 ≤ j ≤ s.
We assume that for every i + 1 ≤ j ≤ s, kij is known only by the process Pi
while kij is known only by Pj. The group restriction can be implemented by
exploiting the following distribution protocol:
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(ν c) (P1 | . . . | Pi−1 | P
′
i | . . . | P
′
s | . . . | Pn)
where
P ′i = (ν c
′) out(〈c′〉
[c]rd[c]in
[ki(i+1)]rd[ki(i+1)]in
).out(〈c′〉
[c]rd[c]in
[ki(i+2)]rd[ki(i+2)]in
) . . .
.out(〈c′〉
[c]rd[c]in
[kis]rd[kis]in
).Pi, and
P ′j = in 〈null〉
[c]
[kij ]
(x).Pj, for i + 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
P ′i creates a new partition c
′ and then distributes it to the processes in Gp thus
reaching the conﬁguration (ν c) (P1 | . . . | Pi−1 | (ν c
′) (Pi | . . . | Ps) | . . . | Pn).
It should be clear that the entry 〈c′〉
[c]rd[c]in
[kij ]rd[kij ]in
can be produced only by P ′i and
that only P ′j can access that entry, for any i + 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
4.2 Group coordination
In this section we discuss how to exploit the merge operator in order to support
the coordination among diﬀerent groups, such as to distribute data to more
than one group. The idea we follow is that a process (a new one or one elected
among those in the groups) takes the role of coordinator ; it knows the partition
associated to each group and, by merging all (or part of) group partitions, can
insert entries that will be accessible to all (or part of) groups as well as read
and remove all entries generated by all groups.
We consider the case where two groups have to be coordinated, the exten-
sion to an arbitrary number of groups is straightforward. Let G = {P1, . . . , Pn}
and G′ = {P ′1, . . . , P
′
k} be two groups of processes that exploit a shared (and
private to the group) partition c and c′ to communicate with each other of the
group, respectively.
We describe in the details the case in which the coordinator provides to
groups a way to insert data that should be accessible in both groups (i.e.
partitions c and c′). In order to avoid to give direct access to the partitions of
the other groups, we assume that each group has an identiﬁer and that knows
the group identiﬁers of the other groups; we use g and g′ for the group G and
G′, respectively. When a process of the group (e.g., G) is willing to produce
an entry that should be available in other groups, it produces an entry in its
space that contains, in the tuple of data ﬁelds, the identiﬁers of the group in
which the entry should be available and the data d it is willing to publish (e.g.,
out(〈g′g, d〉[c]rd[c]rd)). The coordinator removes such entries, logs the request
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and then publishes the entry. The coordinator process deﬁnition follows:
!(in 〈null;null〉[c:c
′](x1; x2).LogReq(x1, x2).out(〈x2〉
[P (x1)]rd[P (x1)]in)),
where LogReq registers the request and P (grp) returns the expression that
merges the partitions identiﬁed in grp (e.g., P (g′g) = c : c′). The role of
coordinator can also be extended by also managing access rights, i.e. checking
if a group can write in a speciﬁed group. It is worth noting that the same
approach can be used if, instead of c and c′, we have to manage two combi-
nations of partitions, in this case we distribute information that are already
available in more than one partition.
5 A system with multi-level security
The ﬂexibility and the expressiveness of the proposed extension is proved in
this section by implementing a multilevel system where a process having access
to a certain level l can also access to each level higher than l.
In order to be as general as possible, we consider that an hierarchical tree
describes the security levels of the system, represented by nodes, and their
(partial) ordering relation, that is: each node (level) is higher than each child.
The model we intend to encode in SecSpaces allows, given a level l, to: i)
produce a new datum at the speciﬁed level l, and ii) perform a data-retrieval
operation that can access datum available either at the level l or at the levels
higher than l. In other words, in this system, a datum produced by processes
accessing level l are available in l and in all levels l′ for which l is higher than
l′. In this way, each leaf of the hierarchical tree can access each level in the
path leaf-root and may be considered as the level with maximum privileges
among those in the path.
In order to encode the system we proceed in two steps: i) we introduce
a new operator for sub-partition the partitions that will be exploited to en-
code the system, and ii) we encode the introduced operator by exploiting the
proposed merge one.
In order to introduce sub-partition operator we extend the syntax of par-
titions:
p ::= c | p : p | p → p.
Given a partition p1, the sub-partition operator allow us to introduce new
partitions (p1 → p, for any p) which are by deﬁnition sub-partitions of p1. In
general, a partition is a sub-partition of another one if the name of the latter
is a preﬁx of the former one (e.g., p1 → p2 → p3 is a sub-partition of p1 → p2
as well as of p1).
The idea we follow is that partitions represent the nodes (i.e. levels) of the
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hierarchical tree and that the sub-partition operator allows us to express the
relation between nodes and ancestors: each partition, say p1, is an ancestor of
each sub-partition of p1, for instance p1 → p expresses that p1 is an ancestor of
p1 → p (e.g., p → c has father p) and then p1 has a level higher than p1 → p.
The deﬁnition of the function ps is extended with the following case:
ps(p1 → c) = {p1 → c} ∪ ps(p1).
By using the merge and sub-partition operators to combine partitions, the
matching rule (see Deﬁnition 3.1) allows to match entries that appear either
in the partition speciﬁed by the template or in each partition with higher level.
In order to encode the system, we assume that the knowledge of the se-
curity levels identiﬁers (i.e. partitions which also represent hierarchical level
relationship via the → operator) has been properly distributed to the pro-
cesses; this phase can be done by exploiting asymmetric partition ﬁelds (for
more details see [2]). The multilevel system provides the following primitives,
whose encoding is:
• out(d, p) = out(〈d〉[p]rd[p]in), that inserts the datum d in the level p,
• rd(dt, p) = rd〈dt〉[p](x), that reads a datum matching with dt by using access
level p, and
• in(dt, p) = in〈dt〉[p](x), that consumes a datum matching with dt by using
access level p.
It should be clear that the system so deﬁned encodes the multi-level system
described above. For instance, a process having access to the level p1 → p can
read/consume any data available at a level in ps(p1 → p).
Finally, here we show how to encode the sub-partition operator by ex-
ploiting only the merge operator. The only change regards the partition
ﬁeld value used by the SecSpaces primitives, that is: i) in the out primi-
tive we keep the same partition p; in the case it contains the sub-partition
operator, it will be considered as part of the partition name, and ii) in
the rd/in primitive, p is encoded as the application of the merge operator
to each partition determined with the extended deﬁnition of ps(p) consid-
ered in this section. For instance, out(d, (c1 : c2) → c3) is encoded with
out(〈d〉[(c1:c2)→c3]rd[(c1:c2)→c3]in) that produces an entry in a partition that is to
an higher level than the one used by rd(dt, ((c1 : c2) → c3) → c4), encoded with
rd〈dt〉[(((c1:c2)→c3)→c4):((c1:c2)→c3):(c1:c2)](x). It is worth noting that the knowledge
necessary for the encoding can be derived (by using the extended deﬁnition
of ps) from the datum stored in the primitives, therefore we do not need to
modify the knowledge of the processes.
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6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have introduced an extension of SecSpaces in order to pro-
vide a solution for problems such as group communication management or
interactions among processes with diﬀerent levels of access permission. The
ﬂexibility of the proposed solution has been proved by describing several ex-
amples in which it is necessary a support for run-time managing of the scope
of entries.
Finally, as future work, we intend to compare the extended version of
SecSpaces with some multilevel systems, such as [4] that is a multilevel system
supporting one-way ﬂow that has some similarities with the model described
in Section 5.
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